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Legal Issues Arising with Civilian UAS Integration
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UAS integration into the national airspace opens up a variety of legal issues 
that must be addressed in light of both UAS airframe and payload 
technologies.
1st, 2nd, 4th , 5th, 10th, 14th 
Amendment Issues
Privacy Torts
Safety Issues
Security Issues
Payload & Cargo 
Specific Legal Issues
Administrative/Airspace 
Issues
Product Liability, Risk, & 
Insurance Issues
Civil Liability & Criminal 
Culpability Issues
3Safety Issues: Collision Avoidance, Ground Safety, Operator Safety
Security Issues: Data Security, Interception Prevention, Hostile Takeover
Privacy Issues: Personal Privacy, Data Privacy
Payload Specific Issues: Hazards (Pesticides), Freight Regulations, etc.
Administrative Issues: Aircraft Registration, Operations Permits, etc.
2nd Amendment Issues: Property Protection, Livestock Protection, etc.
Legal Issues Arising with Civilian UAS Integration
Complexity of Technical Issues
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Complexities arise as issues compound with each other or conflict with 
each other:
Data Security + Data Privacy = Compound Issue
Payload Issues + Safety Issues = Compound Issue
Safety versus Privacy = Compound Issue
It is vital to view UAS integration in the national airspace as a multi-legal  
and multi-technical issue situation.
Many Facets of Security
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Many facets of UAS security: Data security, physical security, personnel 
security, systems security, operations security.
Information Assurance is linked to all of them.
Each area has its own discipline. 
Example: Physical security = aircraft security, ground station security, 
hangar security, equipment security, etc.
Our focus will be UAS data security and information assurance areas.
Cascading Effect of Security
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Security cascades into other areas rapidly making it a central issue in 
UAS operations.
Software Vulnerability Safety Issue Product Liability
Data Security Breach Privacy Tort Civil Liability
Data Integrity Issue Safety Issue Criminal Culpability
Information Assurance 
Fundamentals
7
Information Assurance Fundamentals
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Confidentiality
"Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information..." [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]
"A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information" 
UAS security measures examples: restricted access to data through 
encryption, employment of pilot and user authentication methodologies, 
anti-spoofing technologies
Information Assurance Fundamentals
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Integrity
"Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and 
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity...”
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]
"A loss of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of 
information" 
UAS  security measures examples: encrypted data signatures, stratified 
authentication to restrict access, hardened onboard data storage 
systems, anti-spoofing technology 
Information Assurance Fundamentals
10
Availability
"Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information...”
[44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]
"A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or use of information 
or an information system" 
UAS security measures examples: redundant ground control systems, 
redundant communication systems, backup navigation systems, backup 
data systems including real time backups
Full Spectrum UAS Information Assurance
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Full Spectrum UAS Information Assurance
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RISK
THREAT Vulnerability
Residual Risk
Capabilities, intentions and 
attack methods of 
adversaries to exploit, or 
any circumstance or event 
with the potential to cause 
harm to information or an 
information system.
Weakness in an 
information system, 
cryptographic system, 
security procedures, 
hardware, software or 
other components that 
could be exploited.
A combination of the 
likelihood that a threat will 
occur, the likelihood that 
the threat will result in an 
adverse impact, and the 
severity of the resulting 
impact.
The portion of risk 
that remains after 
security measures 
have been applied.
Threats, Vulnerabilities, & Risk
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Protected 
Domain
= Vulnerability
Intruder
Defense in Depth
Layers of Defense
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The UAS as a System of 
Systems
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UAS as a System of Systems
UAS as a System of Systems
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An UAS is not merely an aircraft but in systems engineering terms, a 
“system of systems” consisting of the aircraft, the ground station, the 
GPS satellite constellation, the communication infrastructure (L-Band, 
C-Band), the launch & recovery infrastructure, the personnel, etc.
All aspects of these systems must be secured and maintain information 
assurance, as data is constantly transmitted in the form of information 
and commands.
The following technical diagrams demonstrate the critical need for 
information assurance and system security in complex UAS operations.
Information Assurance 
Threats to UAS
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UAS  Information Assurance Threats
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As can be seen UAS operations have computational and communicational 
complexity giving rise to increasing risk to information assurance threats.
Attacks can occur in:
- Embedded UAS Systems
- Software
- Hardware
- Combination of the Above 
Embedded Systems Threats
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Embedded security is a major concern for UAS (as well as manned 
aircraft and satellite systems)
Embedded systems tend to have generic hardware & software, which in 
many cases do not have a development process with mandatory security 
protocols (Example: Computer chips from China)
This can result in built in vulnerabilities in the chips (integrated circuit 
hardware) and the software that drives the chips.
The interconnectivity of the system of systems makes these 
vulnerabilities pervasive throughout the entire system. (Example: A virus 
in a UAS chip can spread to the ground station or a networked UAS)
Embedded Systems Threats
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Cyber attack acts impede the physical processing of the controllers; this 
is what makes it dangerous and deadly. 
Malicious manipulations of the controllers can lead to logic issues 
resulting in software corruption or in the worst case scenario physical 
damage to the hardware of the system due to erroneous electrical 
impulses in the physical manifestations of the logic carried out in the 
electronics attached to the controllers. 
The result = damage to the UAS = catastrophic failure or malicious control 
of the UAS from rearranged logic signals
Embedded Systems Threats
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Case Study
The Actel ProASIC chip in the new Boeing 787 had a backdoor that could 
allow chip to be taken over via Internet
A person using the entertainment system in the passenger cabin could 
take over the avionics and control the aircraft!
Viruses and Malware
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Viruses hit the US military drone fleet in 2011 including the Predator and 
Reaper drones through ground station viruses
The keystrokes of operators were logged and sent to outside (potentially 
enemy) sources
Despite repeated efforts, the viruses kept coming back onto the systems
Key Logging Malware the central cause of the incident
Software Exploits
24
In 2011 Iran captured a US RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone
Iran claims it exploited a vulnerability in the software and caused the 
system logic to allow access to flight controls
In 2009 Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded live 
unencrypted video streams from American predator drones
These videos were captured through software exploits of the system
The equipment used by the militants was valued at less than $100
GPS Spoofing
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GPS civilian signals are open standard, free accessibility signals
Transparency and predictability have created a major weakness – the 
ability to be spoofed which means it can be replicated easily
This vulnerability was demonstrated by Professor Todd Humphreys of 
University of Texas at Austin & he testified to Congress on this 
vulnerability
The demonstration proved that a UAS could be hijacked and crashed by 
spoofing its live GPS signal
Types of GPS Spoofing
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Live Satellite Signal Spoofing: user a GPS signal generator, like a fake 
satellite, to synthesize a navigationally consistent signal set and overlay 
and substitute them for the actual satellite signals
Software Code Spoofing: The receiver is actually uploaded with malware 
which makes it appear as functioning normally but the location of the 
UAS is altered
Differential Corrections Spoofing: the digital corrections signal is actually 
spoofed. DCS enhances GPS accuracy to 1 meter so this is a limited 
attack
UAS  Information Assurance Threats
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Overall, research and awareness is key in the developing realm of UAS 
information assurance and security
Information assurance starts from manufacturing and ends with daily 
operational security and awareness
Legal, information assurance, and aviation professionals need to push 
forward on the area of information assurance in the future to ensure it 
stays in the forefront of UAS operations
Continuing education and training in IA and security are vital to maintain 
UAS security
U.S. Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection
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UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
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The critical infrastructures of the United States have only been recently, 
in the past decade and a half, been recognized as a target for cyber 
attacks. 
However, during this time the government has acted, albeit slowly to 
ensure that the national critical infrastructure is adequately protected as 
a national security measure. 
In this section we will briefly discusses the acts and directives meant to 
protect the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, focusing 
on the aviation sector.
Understanding the US critical infrastructure protection directives is 
critical in UAS security and information assurance implementation
UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
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The Presidential Policy Directive PPD-21 that President Obama signed on 
February 12, 2013 entitled "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience" 
advanced a "national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, 
functioning, and resilient critical infrastructures". 
This directive seeks three specific strategic imperatives that will drive the 
Federal approach to strengthen the security of the critical infrastructure:
• Refine and clarify functional relationships across the Federal 
government to advance the national unity of effort to strengthen the 
critical infrastructure security and resilience;
• Enable effective information exchange by identifying baseline data 
and systems requirements for the Federal Government; and
• Implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning 
and operations decisions regarding critical infrastructure.
UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
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The PPD-21 places a significant emphasis on research and development of 
security for critical infrastructure, particularly the cyber infrastructure 
through :
• Promoting research and development to enable the secure and 
resilient design and construction of critical infrastructure and more 
secure accompanying cyber technology;
• Enhancing modeling capabilities to determine potential impacts on 
critical infrastructure of an incident or threat scenario, as well as 
cascading effects on other sectors;
• Facilitating initiatives to incentivize cyber security investments and 
the adoption of critical infrastructure design features that strengthen all 
hazards security and resilience; and
• Prioritizing efforts to support the strategic guidance issues by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.
UAS and Aviation Critical Infrastructure Protection
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Note the increased emphasis on cyber security as compared to the earlier 
laws and directives concerning critical infrastructure. 
The PDD-21 also develops 16 critical infrastructure sectors and assigns 
oversight of these sectors to a Federal Agency. 
The  critical infrastructure area of “Transportation Systems” is a distinct 
area and is assigned to both the Department of Transportation and the 
Department of Homeland Security
This has significant implications for UAS security development, 
implementation and enforcement
Thus the DHS, DOT as well as the FAA will have a significant set of inputs 
into UAS security issues, regulations, and matters in general
It is wise to keep an eye on the critical infrastructure developments at the 
federal level in this arena to see the trends in the security aspects of UAS 
implementation and integration into the national airspace
UAS in the Critical National Infrastructure
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Conclusion
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UAS security is an emerging field as is UAS technology and UAS law
Security must be placed high in importance with safety and privacy
Information Assurance and Security professionals must be kept in the loop 
along with legal and aviation professionals
New information assurance and security technology must be followed 
carefully and merged into the UAS arena
Security affects all areas of UAS operations and as such must be treated as 
a compound issue
Security is everyone’s responsibility
Questions?
35
References
36
The White House. (May 22, 1998) Presidential Directive PDD/NSC-63. Critical Infrastructure Protection. Washington, DC.
42 USC Section 5195c. (October, 2001). Critical Infrastructures Act of 2001.
The White House. (February, 2003). National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. 
Washington, DC.
The White House. (February 12, 2013). Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. Washington, 
DC.
Comision De Investigacion De Accidentes E Incedentes De Aviacion Civil. “Accident Involving Aircraft MD DC-9-82 (MD-82) 
Registration EC-HFP, Operated by Spanair at Madrid Barajas Airport on 20 August 2008”. Interim Report A-032/2008, August 4, 
2009.
Hamilton, J. (2011). Practical Aviation Law 5th Edition. Newcastle: ASA Publishing.
Humphries, T. (July 18, 2012). Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil UAV and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing
